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Over the period of July-August 2009, a number 
of Belarus’ opposition representatives - Anatolij 
Lebedko, Yaroslav Romanchuk (United Civil Party), 
Alexandr Kozulin, Sergej Kalyakin (Communist 
Party of Belarus), Anatolij Levkovich (Belarusian 
Social Democratic Party (Hramada)) - visited Mos-
cow in order to present themselves and opposition 
in general as a potential political partner.
Before we start analyzing the reasons and outcomes 
of these visits, let us note the representation of Russia 
in political discourse of Belarusian opposition. 
In political mythology that Belarusian opposition 
still rests upon, Russia is a guarantor of economic 
and political support thanks to which Lukashenka’s 
regime had existed and flourished for such a long 
time. Therefore, it would be enough to overpersuade 
Russia and redirect its support to the opposite side 
in order to let Belarus get rid of dictatorship and 
become a democratic European state. Moreover, 
a number of oppositionists believe that amicable 
economic and political relations on equal terms 
with Russia are possible. And political regime in 
Belarus is the only obstacle that precludes such a 
relationship. Those politicians convince themselves 
and others that if it were not A. Lukashenka’s regime, 
the relations with Russia would be exceptionally 
constructive. However, while claiming that, on-
going conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, war 
with Georgia, and confrontation with Poland are 
not being taken into account. 
Yet the reason of the conflict between Minsk and 
Moscow is not the dictatorship of Lukashenka as 
such, but his unwillingness to make political and 
economic concessions. As for Russia, the dictator-
ship in Belarus is an indispensible and effective 
tool to maintain Belarus in the sphere influence. 
This was the reason why Belarus could not open a 
dialogue with the West for a long time. However, 
Russia needs a loyal regime. A. Lukashenka recently 
became very intractable and this displeasured Mos-
cow. Consequently, if Russia’s potential to change 
the regime in Belarus is presumed, Russia would 
change it either with as dictatorial as the recent 
one, or with a pseudo-democratic one that would 
Summer is over and we will soon be fully immersed 
in usual rhythm. But before that let us turn back 
and briefly assess the events in Belarus that were 
up in August. 
The spotlight this time was the meeting of Mr. 
Medvedev and Mr. Lukashenka in Sochi, myste-
riously entangled in presuppositions regarding 
the latter’s early departure to the Russian resort. 
Again, no agreements signed, no deals reached. 
Moreover, the treaty on creation of rapid military 
reaction forces (RMRF) still lacks A. Lukashenka’s 
signature, though Russian diplomats were certain 
about that before the CSTO summit in Kirghizia 
in July-August 2009. Disregarding this, military 
training of the RMRF will take place on the terri-
tory of Belarus in September 2009. A. Lukashenka 
is without doubt a master of acrobatic balancing 
on the diplomacy rope. 
As Pavel Usov claims in his latest contribution, 
the opposition of Belarus tries to keep up with 
the leader of the state in terms of balancing. The 
visits of representatives of Belarusian opposition 
parties to Moscow analyzed in detail in the article 
demonstrate opposition’s efforts to complement 
the declining support of the EU.  
Besides support of Belarusian oppositional parties, 
the second leverage that the EU possesses is visa 
policy. Visa policy towards East European states 
is claimed to be the strongest EU’s instrument on 
its purpose to promote democratic developments. 
Its achievements are evaluated in the article by 
Ekaterina Glod.     
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be more loyal, concessive, and completely under 
Moscow’s control.
Therefore, without any democratic developments in 
Russia and its renunciation of imperial ambitions, 
it is impossible to talk about mutually beneficial 
relations between Belarus and Russia and latter’s 
support of democratization in Belarus. Any as-
sumption about authoritarian Russia as an initiator 
of democratic reforms seems absolutely absurd. 
Furthermore, Russia would pose a threat for the 
sovereignty of Belarus irrespective of the regime 
in place. For this reason, rhetoric and actions1 of 
Belarusian oppositionists as well as their willingness 
to rely on Russia in struggle against A. Lukashenka’s 
regime seem reckless and irresponsible. 
The turn of oppositionists towards Russia can be 
explained by the acute economic and political 
conflicts between Russia and Belarus that recently 
intensified as well as by Russia’s irritation regarding 
the reversal of A. Lukashenka’s foreign policy. Not 
least important is the changed EU politics towards 
the regime in Belarus. The opposition ceased to be 
EU’s favorite interlocutor. The EU did not only start 
approaching Mr. Lukashenka, but also significantly 
reduced its support for the opposition (mainly 
financial support). The main reason for that is the 
inefficiency of the opposition, permanent conflicts 
and splits that weaken its structures. Deplorable 
state that the opposition finds itself, even with 
constant financial support from the West, shows its 
inability to take part in country’s political affairs. In 
such conditions the dialogue between the West and 
Belarusian regime seems natural. Actions of some 
Belarusian oppositionists to some extent remind 
A. Lukashenka’s efforts to intimidate Russia to turn 
to the West. Opposition’s actions can be treated a 
‘threat’ to the Western countries to turn to Russia 
in case they stop financing their parties. 
Visits of politicians, who consider themselves 
as leaders of Belarusian opposition, affirm the 
assumptions regarding their willingness to repre-
sent themselves to Russia as worthy partners and 
presidential candidates. In this regard, the visit 
of A. Kozulin to Moscow on August 10th, 2009 is 
demonstrative. During his visit, A. Kozulin had an 
appointment with the head of State Duma’s Com-
mittee for CIS Affairs Aleksej Ostrovskij. It points 
to the fact that Russia, which for a long time used 
not to pay attention to Belarusian opposition, is 
gradually changing the mechanisms of influence. 
A. Kozulin’s visit to Moscow was not the first one. 
In 2006, being a presidential candidate, A. Kozulin 
repeatedly visited Russia in order to gain Russia’s 
support. A. Kozulin’s visits to Moscow, meetings 
and conferences produced an image that namely he 
was Moscow’s project aimed at splitting the united 
opposition camp.
There is no doubt that Kremlin is an initiator of the 
recent meetings with Belarusian oppositionists. It 
implies that the opposition is merely an object that 
1 «Белорусская оппозиция предложила Рос-
сии «перезагрузку», http://www.svobodanews.
ru/content/transcript/1768890.html. 
will be used in Russia’s interests. Thus, in case there 
is any agreement between Russian ruling elite and 
Belarusian opposition directed against Lukashenka’s 
regime, the outcome of such mutual actions could 
be highly deplorable for Belarus.
Meanwhile, the visits of the opposition to Moscow 
have to be evaluated as an element of symbolic 
and psychological impact on A. Lukashenka. The 
purpose is to show that there are no ‘irreplaceable 
dictators’ and Russia may start outlining a new 
political project. 
However, at present Moscow’s flirt with the rep-
resentatives of Belarusian opposition can hardly 
menace the political regime in Belarus. The very 
Moscow’s support could unlikely contribute to 
opposition’s abilities to change political situation 
in Belarus. The regime is consolidated as before, 
the opposition weak and disunited. The very 
economic crisis has not shaken the stability of the 
regime that continues to repress its enemies and 
control the society. The regime is able to eliminate 
any political threat on the part of the opposition, 
even if it enjoys Russia’s support. Certainly, with 
a condition that Russia is not planning military 
aggression against Belarus. Any oppositional 
structures formed with the participation of Russia 
will be resolved and swept away even before the 
beginning of presidential campaign. Furthermore, 
it is extremely difficult to form such political or-
ganizations under conditions of strong control, 
not to speak about mobilization of supporters. 
In case a real pro-Russian oppositional candidate 
who would threaten the regime ever appears, he 
definitely will not be registered.  
As for today, among the Moscow’s visitors 
only Sergei Kalyakin can pretend to be a pro-
Russian candidate. However, having in mind that 
Mr. Kalyakin leans solely upon Communist Party 
of Belarus, he will unlikely be able to mobilize so-
ciety and opposition. Unification of the opposition 
and joint support of Mr. Kalyakin as a candidate 
for the President of Belarus is feasible only with 
enormous financial resources. 
Warm relations between Belarusian opposition 
and authorities in Russia will contribute to the 
intensification of anti-Russian and anti-opposi-
tional propaganda that in turn will strengthen 
A. Lukashenka’s position both in the society and 
in the eyes of Western politicians. Moreover, the 
opposition harms itself rather than the regime and 
its stability for the following reasons. 
First, relationship with Moscow will lead to even 
greater internal fragmentation in both the op-
position and United Democratic Forces. Such 
organizations as BNF and Movement for Freedom 
will hardly enter the pro-Russian coalition that 
could be formed by the United Civil Party (UCP), 
Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Hramada) 
(BSDP) and Communist Party of Belarus (CPB). 
This would mean that two opposing candidates 
nominated by the opposition will run for president 
as it was in 2006. Both will contend each other 
rather than A. Lukashenka. Moreover, unconcealed 
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pro-Russian positions of some parties, e.g. BSDP, 
can lead to further deepening of crisis inside the 
party, routine split and drift of supporters. In the 
end, before the election the opposition will seem 
even weaker.       
Second, new eastern orientation of Belarusian 
opposition will cause wide resentment among 
democratically minded population. For these 
people Russia is a symbol of authoritarianism 
and imperialism. It will be extremely difficult to 
dissuade them. They will unlikely support the idea 
of replacing A. Lukashenka to make Belarus fully 
dependent on Russia.     
Third, it is likely that nomination of a pro-Russian 
candidate for the Presidency will expand the 
dialogue between Western countries and official 
Minsk. 
However, it is too soon to judge the dialogue be-
tween representatives of Belarusian opposition 
and Moscow as a serious game played by Russia 
against the regime in Belarus. On the other hand, 
such a possibility cannot be ignored. In case the 
crisis between Belarus and Russia deepens, the 
latter will use all possible leverages.   
To speak about the Belarusian opposition itself, 
its toss between Moscow and Belarus evidences 
the fact that for today it has no long-term strategy 
concerning the upcoming Presidential election and 
political activity as a whole. The state of the opposi-
tion is so unfortunate that some parties are ready to 
look for help anywhere. Even if it contradicts their 
proclaimed principles and values.  
V i s a - F r e e  t r a V e l  t O  e u r O p e :  a 
r e a l i s t i c  p e r s p e c t i V e  F O r  B e l a r u s ?
Ekaterina Glod
The fact that citizens of East European countries 
judge the European Union (EU) in terms of its visa 
policy towards them is hardly a new one. Indeed, 
for most visa applicants a meeting with a consular 
officer is their first direct contact with a citizen 
of the EU. Hence, the way this process is carried 
out can either contribute to a positive image of 
the EU, or, on the contrary, significantly damage 
the reputation of EU Member States, particularly 
when visa application process becomes, in the 
words of Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, 
a ‘bureaucratic and costly nightmare’1.
Obtaining a Schengen visa for third country na-
tionals has never been an easy process. However, 
a recent study on visa obtainment process2 reveals 
that the adoption of Schengen visa regime by new 
EU Member States in December 2007 dramatically 
decreased the number of visas issued to East Euro-
peans. Statistics show that in 2008 the number of 
visas issued to Belarusians has declined the most: 
by 73% less issued in Poland, by 52% - in Lithuania, 
by 34% - in Latvia3. The situation was aggravated 
by an often degrading and humiliating attitude 
experienced by visa applicants as well as by lengthy 
and burdensome visa application procedures.  
The situation for Belarusians seems indeed most 
unfortunate. Not only they pay nearly twice as 
much as their neighbours do (€60 for a Schengen 
visa as compared to €35 to Moldovans, Russians 
1 Rehn, O. (2006), Visa facilitation for Serbia, Novi Sad, ‘Exit’ fes-
tival, SPEECH/06/441, 6 July.
2 Stephan Batory Foundation (2009), Changes in Visa Policies of 
the EU Member States. New Monitoring Report. Warsaw. 
3 Ibid. P. 57.
and Ukrainians), they also have to go through a 
more complex and time-consuming visa application 
process. This state of affairs is in contradiction with 
the EU’s aim to foster human contacts with citizens 
of Belarus and largely evidences the inconsistency 
of the EU visa policy towards Belarus. It also bears 
negative political implications since the current visa 
regime de facto takes away a chance to ‘europeanise’ 
those Belarusians who are mostly susceptible: ac-
cording to an analysis of the Belarusian Institute 
for Strategic Studies4, the enlargement of the 
Schengen zone has closed the door to Europe for 
those Belarusians who were largely unsure about 
their pro-European identity choice.  
The year-long rapprochement between the EU 
and the government of Belarus raises both ques-
tions and hope for easing Belarusians’ travelling to 
Europe. Is there a chance in the near future that 
Belarusians will pay less and go through shorter 
visa application procedures? How realistic is the 
prospect of visa-free travel?  
Historical implications   
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) introduced the 
idea of establishing a ‘European area of freedom, 
security and justice’, which, among other pillars, 
provided for the creation of a common territory 
without internal borders along with the setting-up 
of a common external border. The treaty marked 
the emergence of a changed notion of security 
threats in the sense that ‘a safe inside should be 
4 Melyantsou, Dz. and Silitski, V. (June 2008), How to lower Schen-
gen visa costs for Belarusians (www.belinstitute.eu).
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most effectively protected from an unsafe outside’5. 
Hence the control of external frontiers became a 
major objective of the EU cooperation in justice and 
home affairs, whereas the issue of visas took up an 
important role in the EU’s understanding of effective 
and comprehensive border management.  
The Amsterdam Treaty transferred far-reaching 
competences in the visa domain from national 
states to the European Community. The latter in 
turn developed a common visa policy for third 
country nationals. At the heart of this policy was 
the Council Regulation No. 539/2001 that named 
countries whose nationals must be in possession 
of visas when crossing the EU external border (the 
so-called ‘negative list’) as well as countries whose 
nationals were exempt from the requirement (the 
‘positive list’)6. Citizens of countries placed on the 
negative visa list were by definition considered as 
potential security risks. Belarus was among many 
other countries that constituted the negative list. 
Since the adoption of the EU visa regime was part 
of the acquis communautaire for the countries 
seeking accession, the new EU Member States were 
required to introduce Schengen visas to neighbour-
ing countries’ citizens given that these states were 
included into the negative visa list. This resulted 
in disruption of socioeconomic and political rela-
tionships across border regions, where previously 
people had enjoyed a greater freedom of movement, 
whilst also created a potential for establishing new 
dividing lines in Europe. The negative side-effects 
of the strict visa regime were soon recognised by 
the EU, consequently measures aimed at mitigating 
these effects started to be discussed. 
There was yet another reason for the EU to revise its 
visa policy. It soon became obvious that strict visa 
policies were not only negatively effecting the image 
of the EU in its neighbourhood and contradicting 
EU’s goals to promote human contacts. It imposed 
obstacles for legal crossing of the external EU border 
and, what is more, failed to succeed in preventing 
irregular immigration and organised crime. More 
effective tools to combat illegal migration and at the 
same time promoting contacts between people had 
to be found. One such tool proved to be the signing 
of Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements 
(VFRA) with third countries. 
VFRA
The new security approach was an attempt to 
balance internal security concerns and external 
stabilisation needs. The EU eased travel conditions 
in exchange for signing the VFRA that obliged a 
third country to implement reforms in justice and 
home affairs. Thus the EU sought at once to push 
for reforms in neighbouring countries and react 
5 Trauner, F. and Kruse, I. (2008), EC Visa Facilitation and Re-
admission Agreements: Implementing a New EU Security Ap-
proach in the Neighbourhood.
6 The two lists were determined by a considered, case-by-case as-
sessment of a variety of criteria relating, inter alia, to illegal mi-
gration, public policy and security, and the EU’s external rela-
tions, also taking into consideration the implications of regional 
coherence and reciprocity. 
to the discontent regarding tough visa regime. The 
VFRA offered a better way to fight illegal migration 
since it provided for the return of illegal migrants 
and rejected asylum seekers. Yet the EU had to 
overcome the difficulty to motivate third countries 
to sign such an agreement. Nonetheless, in case 
of the VFRA signed by the EU and Russia, for the 
first time a firm link between readmission and visa 
issue was established.   
Currently the EU has signed VFRA with countries 
in Western Balkans, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. 
The Balkan countries served as a model for the 
above mentioned ENP countries given that the 
country had an ENP Action Plan in force and met 
the proper preconditions7.  
In short, VFRA stipulates for cheaper and easier 
travel, study and business conditions while ensur-
ing the return of illegal immigrants. Although 
facilitations slightly differ depending on the country, 
generally they provide for a simplification of docu-
mentary procedures, issue of multiple-entry visas 
with a long period of validity, waiver/reduction of 
fees for specific categories of citizens and setting 
of deadlines for visa issue. Although VFRA reduces 
the visa costs for all citizens (currently set at €35), 
its facilitations concern only certain categories of 
applicants (such as business people, journalists, 
drivers of international cargo and passenger trans-
portation services, pupils, students, scientists). Such 
a provision leaves the rest of the citizens behind 
the simplified visa procedures. Worth mentioning 
is also the fact that while the facilitations provided 
for in the VFRAs for the Western Balkans apply for 
tourists, the agreements with Moldova, Russia and 
Ukraine lack such a provision8. 
An important component of all VFRAs is a provi-
sion establishing joint monitoring committees 
composed of EC officials assisted by experts from 
the member states and partner countries. These 
committees may suggest amendments to the present 
agreements, settle disputes as well as provide a con-
trolling mechanism, ensuring fair and transparent 
visa application procedures. 
Although it may still be too soon to assess the qual-
ity of the implementation of the VFRAs (most of 
the them came into force in 2008), some clear-cut 
advantages can already be noticed. According to the 
Stefan Batory Foundation’s study, VFRAs increase 
the frequency of visa fee waivers while reducing the 
procedure’s length9. For example, the volume of 
Schengen visas issued to Ukrainians increased by 
134% in 2008, while around one third of the Ukrain-
ian applicants benefited from visas free of charge10. 
Moreover, applicants from Moldova, Ukraine and 
7 Commission of the European Communities (2006), Communi-
cation from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Pol-
icy, COM (2006) 726 final, Brussels, 04.12.2006. 
8 Trauner, F. and Kruse, I. (2008), EC Visa Facilitation and Re-
admission Agreements: Implementing a New EU Security Ap-
proach in the Neighbourhood. P. 18.
9 P. 8. Ibid
10 Press Release of the EC Delegation to Ukraine: http://
ec.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/press_cor-
ner/all_news/news/20090416_01_en.htm.
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Russia receive visas with a longer term of validity 
than the ones issued for Belarusians (92 versus 58 
days)11. The setting up of the EU Common Visa 
Application Centre in Chisinau under the VFRA 
framework took away the extra burden of visiting 
individual consulates since it issues visas to seven 
EU member states. 
Where does Belarus stand?
The cost of a Schengen visa for Belarusians remains 
€60 since no visa facilitation agreement has been 
concluded between Belarus and the EC. Formally, 
there are no legal grounds for initiating a discussion 
on the VFRA, as Belarus does not have an ENP 
Action Plan in force, as required by the EC Com-
munication 726. Furthermore, it is questionable 
whether Belarus fully meets other pre-conditions 
set out in the Communication, such as efficient 
readmission and border management as well as 
cooperation in fighting illegal immigration. The 
issue of readmission is of great importance in the 
process of visa facilitation, particularly bearing 
in mind the fact that negotiations with Russia 
and Ukraine started namely with discussions on 
readmission agreements. 
The launch of the Eastern Partnership initiative in 
May 2009 could constitute a new legal framework 
for visa facilitation for Belarus. However, such a 
possibility is complicated by 15 years of troublesome 
Belarus-EU relations. The ratification of Belarus’s 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 
with the EC and the entering into force of the 
Interim agreement were stopped in 1997. Natu-
rally, without an adequate basic legal framework, 
Belarus can neither fully participate in the EaP, 
nor conclude agreements on readmission and visa 
facilitation. However, the recent improvement in 
Belarus-EU relations can imply that the PCA may 
soon be concluded. 
For the moment, discussions on reducing visa 
fees and simplifying application procedures 
for Belarusians have been confined to political 
deliberations. For example, in June President A. 
Lukashenka asked Benita Ferrero-Waldner to 
lower visa fees for Belarusians, while during the EU 
troika meeting in July Foreign Minister of Belarus 
Mr. Martynov claimed the facilitation of the visa 
regime to be a clear priority for Belarus. The reac-
tion of the Belarusian authorities is not surprising, 
if one considers the degree of ordinary Belarusians’ 
discontent realising that they are paying for visas 
twice as much as their neighbours. Therefore, the 
government would like to present itself as a suc-
cessful negotiator. Visa facilitation is also likely to 
ease travelling for officials themselves, as ‘members 
of official delegations’ is a category of citizens fall-
ing under simplified travelling procedures, whilst 
the exemption of visa obligation for diplomats is 
standard practice in most VFRAs.
11 Stephan Batory Foundation (2009), Changes in Visa Policies of 
the EU Member States. New Monitoring Report. Warsaw.
The EU has taken the request of the Belarusian 
authorities with certain caution – whilst recognising 
that the visa mechanism is ‘flexible’, it pointed out 
the need to achieve a common (by all EU mem-
ber states) agreement on the matter. Moreover, it 
was noted that the decision would depend on the 
progress of democratisation in Belarus12. The prin-
ciple of reciprocity inherent in the VFRA should 
also be taken into account when considering the 
possibility of visa facilitation: reduction of visa fees 
for Belarusians would mean lower fees to Europeans 
to enter Belarus (currently set at approximately €60). 
Whether the Belarusian authorities are prepared to 
take such a step is unclear as this would significantly 
diminish revenues from this source.
Visa-free travel
Today visa-free travel for Belarusians seems even a 
more unrealistic prospect. The openness of the EU 
to East European travellers, including Belarusians, 
can be judged by the elimination of clear references 
to a visa-free regime from the Eastern Partnership 
final Declaration. The Commission’s original pro-
posal included the removal of visa requirements 
altogether13, while the document adopted at the 
Prague Summit offered the partners a simplified 
visa application system and ‘gradual steps towards 
full visa liberalisation’ on a case-by-case basis and as 
a ‘long-term goal’ only. Thus, it remains to be seen 
whether the decision to liberalise visas will find its 
expression in concrete measures. 
As for now, only the Western Balkan countries face 
a realistic perspective of visa-free travel, bearing in 
mind that these countries bear the status of ‘can-
didates’ or ‘potential candidates’ for EU member-
ship. Even for them it has been a long and difficult 
process. Macedonia alone has fulfilled the require-
ments for a visa-free regime. Each of the Western 
Balkan countries received a ‘roadmap’, defining the 
exact conditions to be met in the areas of border 
management, document security and measures 
against organised crime. The requirements ranged 
from purely technical questions, such as issue of 
passports with biometric data, to the adoption and 
implementation of a package of laws and interna-
tional conventions. The effective implementation 
of the VFRAs was set as a pre-condition for further 
dialogue on visa liberalisation. 
Based on the facts outlined above, it is obvious that 
Belarus is still far from entering a visa-free travel 
regime with Europe. Even if it has achieved certain 
progress in the comprehensive border management 
through the ongoing TACIS/EC projects in the 
area, the rest of the conditions seem outside the 
scope of Belarus’ achievements. Within the very 
EaP’s framework for mobility and security initiative, 
12 See, for example, statements of Benita Ferrero-Waldner in Vi-
zovy vopros: belorusy stali namnogo menshe ezdit v Evro-
pu i Polshu (www.tut.by, 23 June 2009) and Ferera-Wald-
ner – Survile: “Vizavaya palityka EZ hnutkaya” (www.
svaboda.org, 3 July 2009) and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl 
Bildt in Martynov: ochevidny prioritet dlia Belarusi – upro-
schenie vizovogo rezhima ES (www.tut.by, 29 July 2009).
13 European Commission (2008). Eastern Partnership. Com-
munication from the Commision, 3 December 2008.
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Belarus first should solve the problem of freedom 
of movement with Russia.    
The only prospect for easing travel to Europe for 
Belarusians seems to be the new Visa Code that 
should bring significant facilitations for all visa ap-
plicants, whatever their nationality. In particular, the 
facilitations would include an obligation for a con-
sular officer to give a reason for any visa refusal, the 
possibility for a visa applicant to appeal a consular 
officer’s decision, harmonisation of certain forms, a 
more precise definition of supporting documents, 
etc. Moreover, it would reduce the visa fee for a small 
category of applicants, in particular for children as 
well as would waive visa fees for researchers and 
representatives of NGOs under 25. The Community 
Code on Visas was adopted on June 25th 2009 and 
has by now entered into force.  
Concluding remarks
History shows that the EU visa policy can be an 
effective lever for initiating comprehensive reforms 
in third countries. In case of Belarus, the visa policy 
is one of the few EU’s instruments to foster politi-
cal and social change in the country. Yet Belarus 
is not given sufficient attention or shown enough 
interest by the EU Member States so that the EU 
would break its bureaucratic rules and simplify visa 
application procedures for Belarusians. The EU 
considers visa facilitation conditional on political 
liberalisation in the country. Yet the former can 
become a cause of the latter. In the long run, the real 
development of the EU Eastern policy will only take 
shape through the facilitation of people-to-people 
contacts between the EU Member States and their 
neighbouring countries. Facilitation of travelling 
conditions for these countries seems to be the first 
step on the way to achieve this goal.
